Abstract
1 An anonymous reviewer for Religion & Human Rights noted that the term 'conscientious objection' is not uncontroversial in relation to marriage officials, because of the alleged difference with conscientious objection to abortion and military service (both discussed in the Conclusion of this Article). When I utilise the term 'conscientious objection' (and analogues such as 'conscientiously object to') in relation to civil servants, I refer in the first place to the reasons civil servants invoke to refuse to perform marriage services. These reasons are related to their conscience and inability to reconcile the act of registration of same-sex marriages with their religious convictions. In that descriptive sense, their refusal mirrors that of health professionals who refuse to perform abortions and Jehovah's Witnesses or pacifists who refuse to perform military service. Therefore, I consider it appropriate to use the term 'conscientious objection' to describe all three cases. In this Article, I analyse the UK and Netherlands approach in terms of the limits of toleration in the liberal State. My primary aim is to offer a coherent explanation of the relevant practice. I locate that explanation in the political theoretical concept of toleration, and -more particularly -its limits. My core argument is that the UK courts' and Dutch legislator's 6 The term 'partnerships' is used throughout to describe the UK case, since the events in the Ladele case took place before the enactment of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013. The same arguments, obviously, apply to the current situation, in which marriage is available to same-sex couples in the UK. 7 decisions are best understood as drawing the limits of toleration at the point where civil servants cause same-sex couples expressive harm.
In this Article, I provide an alternative account to existing scholarly analyses of the issue. My aim is, in particular, to improve upon those existing analyses. First, I aim to present an account that is more coherent with the actual practice than accounts that favour the civil servant, proponents of which generally submit that the civil servant should be granted an exemption or be reasonably accommodated.
11 Although those accounts may appear powerful on paper, they have one fatal flaw. They fail, quite utterly, to explain the actual practice in
States like the UK, Canada, 12 the US and the Netherlands, in which courts and legislators have firmly and unequivocally rejected civil servants' freedom of religion claims. 13 In this Article, I instead propose an account that is fully consonant with, and successfully explains, the relevant practice.
Second, the approach I propose in this Article aims to avoid the pitfalls into which some accounts that favour same-sex equality have fallen. Most particularly, I avoid hinging the argument on the contested belief-conduct distinction. At least one scholar who relies on the belief-conduct distinction to explain the relevant practice has admitted that it is 'not an ideal conceptual device', 14 since it is potentially 'damaging and counter-productive'. 15 can be found that allows all parties to exercise their human rights -freedom of religion and same-sex equality -why not favour it? An analogous solution has, after all, been adopted in the case of abortion, on which legislation in the UK and the Netherlands contains a conscience clause for doctors and other health professionals. 
The Core Concept of Toleration and the Respect Conception of Vertical Toleration
The principle of toleration has deep roots in the history of liberal thought. It dates back to at least the XVII th Century and the works of -among others -John Locke and Pierre Bayle. 47 There exists some disagreement in the literature as to whether the existence of power relations between the agent and object of toleration should be part of the core concept of toleration and as to whether the objection component of toleration also includes dislike (in addition to disapproval 
Drawing the Limits of Toleration
Conscience-based refusals by civil servants to registering same-sex marriages/partnerships warrant disapproval by the liberal State, since they prima facie contravene the core liberal value of equality (discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). Unlike in the abortion case, the UK courts and Dutch legislator have, however, intervened to curb the practice. It is submitted here that the relevant decisions can successfully be explained in terms of the limits of toleration.
The Dutch legislative debate on the 2014 Act, in particular, was firmly rooted in the language of toleration. In delivering its negative advice on the 2014 Act, which bars persons who would contravene anti-discrimination legislation from obtaining the post of civil servant, The legislator did, however, clearly disapprove of the practice at issue (disapproval thereof 81 Council of State (the Netherlands), Advice W04.12.0331/I (12 October 2012) (author's translation; original: 'Een pragmatische benadering, welke past in de Nederlandse traditie van tolerantie ten opzichte van afwijkende opvattingen, zou dan ook voor de hand liggen.'). It should be noted that the Dutch language does not distinguish between toleration and tolerance. In Dutch, there exists only one word: tolerantie. It has been translated as 'toleration' in the text, since that seems to me to be a fair interpretation. 82 Explanatory Report to 2014 Act, supra note 29 (emphasis in original; author's translation; original: 'ruimte geven aan gewetensbezwaren in zijn algemeenheid past in de Nederlandse traditie van tolerantie ten opzichte van verschillende godsdienstige opvattingen [...] helaas zijn er in de Nederlandse samenleving ook ontwikkelingen, die haaks staan op deze traditie [...] Het probleem is, dat godsdiensten niet altijd even tolerant zijn.'). 83 Ibid. (emphasis in original; author's translation; original: 'Wat in een klimaat van intolerantie wèl kan helpen, is het niet louter zoeken van "pragmatische oplossingen" voor de gevolgen van die intolerantie, maar het consequent handhaven van het verbod van discriminatie.'). 84 Ibid.
was, after all, the very reason for the adoption of the 2014 Act). 85 Hence, currently employed civil servants who refuse to register same-sex marriages are (temporarily) tolerated in the Netherlands, at least insofar as the Dutch legislator is concerned.
86
Contrary to the Dutch legislative debate on the 2014 Act, the UK courts' rulings are not replete with the language of toleration. This can be explained by the more restrictive role of the judiciary, which is -in principle -to apply the law, not 'decide on the rights and wrongs of toleration'. 87 Although the language of tolerance and toleration does occasionally crop up in judicial rulings, 88 it is arguably more congenial to political debate. 89 Unlike political bodies, courts are limited to the use of legal language. It should thus not come as a surprise that, in judicial rulings, the language of toleration is generally replaced by language with which the law is more familiar. In the UK case of Lillian Ladele, this was the language of reasonable accommodation and of (indirect) discrimination. Yet, this does not detract from the fact that the UK courts have given practical effect to the same underlying idea as the one explicitly relied on by the Dutch legislator: in a liberal State, the practice of civil servants who refuse to register same-sex marriages/partnerships exceeds the limits of toleration, and can therefore not be allowed. 
Why Draw the Limits There? Toleration and Expressive Harm
85 This is further underscored by the fact that the 2014 Act includes an amendment to the antidiscrimination law that would allow municipalities to dismiss civil servants without running the risk of being found in violation of antidiscrimination legislation. The debate in the House of Lords, in particular, was to a significant extent phrased -by the supporters of the amendment -in terms of "tolerance/toleration" by the government towards 'a small minority' (the affected registrars). These arguments did not succeed, however. This shows implicit approval by the UK legislator of the judicial solution reached in Ladele, supra note 7. 90 The author is grateful to Robert Wintemute for discussion on this point, and for suggesting the approach offered in the text.
I have submitted that the UK courts' ruling and the Dutch 2014 Act can be understood in terms of the limits of toleration. Yet, the question remains: why were those limits exceeded?
After all, in neither the UK, nor the Netherlands, were same-sex couples denied a public service. They thus did not suffer any material harm. 91 Here, I argue that the limits of toleration were nevertheless exceeded because same-sex couples suffered expressive harm.
92
Ever since John Stuart Mill wrote On Liberty, the liberal tradition has recognised the existence of a strong link between toleration and harm, in the sense that the limits of toleration should be drawn by some version of the harm principle. 93 How broad or narrow one conceives of these limits is determined by how one interprets harm. I submit that the Dutch legislator's and the UK courts' decisions are best understood in terms of expressive harm.
The notion of expressive harm is directly related to the expressive function of law: the law should express appropriate attitudes toward persons. 94 The "appropriate" attitude is generally interpreted as one of equal concern and respect. 95 95 Anderson and Pildes, supra note 94, p. 1520 (with reference to Dworkin on the link with 'equal concern and respect').
individuals in society are worthy of equal respect. 96 State action can, however, also take a negative expressive turn, namely when it causes expressive harm.
Expressive harm is, then, the harm suffered by a person 'when she is treated [by the State] according to principles that express negative or inappropriate attitudes toward her'. 97 Expressive harm is thus closely linked with the notion of "second-class citizenship".
98
Arguably the historically most prominent example is that of racial segregation, as it was once practiced in the United States. 99 Racial segregation causes expressive harm because it 'sends the message that blacks are untouchable, a kind of social pollutant from which "pure" whites must be protected'. 100 It is important to note, as illustrated by the racial segregation example, that expressive harm is not only caused by verbally communicated messages, but also by nonverbal State action.
101
I submit that the decisions of the UK courts and the Dutch legislator are best understood as recognising that civil servants were causing expressive harm to same-sex couples by refusing to register same-sex marriages/partnerships. Not only were they acting as State agents, their duties of registration were also directly identified as State duties. 102 By refusing to register same-sex marriages and partnerships, the civil servants failed to treat and a public authority wholly committed to the promotion of equal opportunities and to requiring all its employees to act in a way which does not discriminate against others"'. 110 The But this does not provide a satisfactory answer, since conscience clauses in abortion legislation also apply to health professionals in public hospitals, that is to public officials. The explanation for the difference must thus be located elsewhere.
A few hypotheses can be ventured. First, a hypothesis on the nature of the actions performed. In the same-sex marriage/partnership case, being forced to act against one's conscience entails having to register a same-sex marriage or partnership by signing a piece of paper. In the abortion case, conversely, it requires active and personal involvement in the termination of what one considers to be life. 118 There are, thus, important differences between the abortion and the same-sex marriage/partnership case: the doctor's action in the abortion case is both graver and more directly related to her conscience than that of the civil servant in the same-sex marriage/partnership case. 119 These differences arguably go a long way towards explaining why toleration is extended in the abortion case, but not in the same-sex marriage/partnerships case. A second hypothesis complements the first: the doctor's refusal is more easily accessible in the language of public reason. The doctor's refusal can, more particularly, be expressed in secular language on the value of (or right to) life, which is accessible to all persons, including those who hold different beliefs. 120 The civil servant's objection, conversely, can only sensibly be expressed in religious terms. To non-believers, including the State, it will -as the practice shows -tend to come across as homophobia, since it cannot easily be detached from conservative religious views that categorise same-sex conduct as a "sin". Both hypotheses, when combined, arguably explain the difference between the same-sex marriage/partnership and the abortion case. They explain why the latter is tolerated in liberal States like the UK and the Netherlands, while the former is not.
Closely related to the same-sex marriage/partnership cases studied in this Article, are cases in which private persons refuse to facilitate same-sex marriages/partnerships. 121 A prominent legal case is that of Bull v. Hall, involving Christian bed and breakfast owners in the UK who refused to let a double room to a same-sex couple. 122 The UK Supreme Court ruled against the bed and breakfast owners, finding that they had unjustly discriminated against the same-sex couple. The practice of the bed and breakfast owners was thus, just like that of civil servants, not tolerated. There are, however, crucial differences between both cases. Most importantly, the bed and breakfast owners are private citizens, not State agents. 119 In that sense, as Nejaime and Siegel have usefully pointed out, the relevant comparator to the doctor in the abortion case is not the civil servant refusing to register a same-sex marriage, but a member of the clergy refusing to solemnize a same-sex marriage. Interestingly, this more comparable situation is, like the abortion case, generally covered by an exemption: members of the clergy cannot be forced to solemnize same-sex marriages. Since expressive harm is intimately tied to State action, the explanation offered in this Article as to why the limits of toleration were exceeded in the case of the civil servants cannot be extended to the bed and breakfast owners. The question therefore arises: where is the harm in the bed and breakfast case? The obvious answer is that the case entails material harm: denial of services. 123 This explains why the practice in the bed and breakfast case is not tolerated, just like the practice of the civil servants.
124
The final case to be considered is that of conscientious objection to military service.
Here, interestingly, exemptions are usually granted to both religious and non-religious 125 It may consider the importance of national security, but this is not a basic liberal value. It being potentially in jeopardy is thus not, on the argument presented in this Article, a cause for disapproval by the liberal State (although it might still be cause to refuse to grant an exemption).
